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In re Review of Proposed Town of New
Shoreham Project:
A Survey and Commentary on an
Important Decision for Rhode Island's
Renewable Energy Development
David M. DiSegna*

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to chapter 26.1 of title 39 of the Rhode Island
General Laws entitled "Long-Term Contracting Standard for
Renewable Energy" ("2009 LTC statute"), Narragansett Electric
Company d/b/a National Grid ("National Grid") and Deepwater
Wind Block Island, LLC ("Deepwater Wind") entered into an
Power Purchase Agreement ("2009 PPA") for the construction of a
small-scale wind farm off the coast of Block Island and for the sale
of the electricity produced there
However, this 2009 PPA was
rejected by The Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (the
"PUC" or the "commission") based on the standards for approval
promulgated by the General Assembly in the 2009 LTC statute. 2
In response to the PUC's rejection of the 2009 PPA, the General
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2012;
B.A. Boston University, 2009. The author would like to express his
appreciation to Katharine Kohm for her very helpful feedback and insight
while writing this survey and to the Law Review members who assisted in
the final editing process.
1. In re Proposed New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 482, 485-86,
489-90 (R.I. 2011).
2.

Id. at 491, 494.
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Assembly quickly amended the 2009 LTC statute creating a new
amended LTC statute that allowed National Grid and Deepwater
Wind to amend their contract (the "amended PPA").3 This
amended LTC statute also changed the criteria that were required
for the amended PPA to gain PUC approval.4 Based on these new
statutory criteria, the amended PPA was approved by the PUC.5
The decision to approve the amended PPA was then challenged in
the Rhode Island Supreme Court in the matter entitled In re
Review of ProposedNew Shoreham Project.6

Part I of this survey will give a detailed account of the facts
and travel of the case. Part II will discuss the many legal issues
in the case and the Court's holding and reasoning on each issue.
Part III will explore the decision's impact on Rhode Island,
including potential long-term benefits as well as costs to the State,
and will also discuss an interesting legal issue raised by this case
concerning the distinction between legislatively-created standards
of review and those crafted strictly by the judiciary.
I. BACKGROUND

A. The 2009 LTC Statute and 2009 PPA
The PUC is a "'quasi-judicial' regulatory body which is
charged with overseeing Rhode Island's public utilities to ensure
that there is sufficient competition between energy companies and
that reasonable energy rates are maintained. The PUC is made
up of three members who are "appointed by the governor with the
advice and consent of the senate" based on their expertise.' The
commission holds investigations and hearings to determine to
reasonableness of energy rates and other matters involving energy
distribution. 9 It then renders independent decisions in these
matters based on the law and evidence presented before it.10 The
General Assembly has also specifically directed the commission to
3. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-26.1-7 (Supp. 2010); In re Proposed New
Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 495-96.
4. § 39-26.1-7; In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 495-96.
5. In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 503.
6. Id.
7. R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-1-3(a) (2006).
8. R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-1-4(a) (Supp. 2010).
9. Id. § 39-1-3(a).
10. R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-1-11 (2006).
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promote the use of renewable energy to help decrease the State's
use of fossil fuels."
To achieve these goals, the General Assembly passed the 2009
LTC statute which was signed into law by then-Governor Donald
L. Carcieri on June 26, 2009.12 Specific to this case, section 3926.1-7 entitled "Town of New Shoreham Project" called for
National Grid to solicit proposals from developers for a small-scale
wind farm off the coast of Block Island along with a separate
transmission cable project to transfer energy from Block Island to
the mainland. 13 The 2009 version of section 39-26.1-7 also stated
that any contract for the wind farm project between National Grid
and a developer must be '"commercially reasonable,"' such that the
contract must contain "'terms and pricing that are reasonably
consistent with what an experienced power market analyst would
expect to see in transactions involving newly developed renewable
energy resources."'1 4
Deepwater Wind was the sole developer to propose a wind
farm project to National Grid, and in 2009, the two companies
entered into the 2009 PPA to build such a wind farm and
distribute the generated electricity throughout Rhode Island for
twenty years.15 The 2009 PPA called for a price of 24.4 cents per
kilowatt hour for ratepayers, with a 3.5% increase for each year of
the contract beginning in 2013.16 However, no estimated cost for
constructing the project was stated in this contract.1 7 The 2009
PPA also included provisions pertaining to the construction and
ownership of a transmission cable and called for separate
negotiations and contracts for that project.1 8 However, National
Grid was explicitly given the right to opt out of participating in

11. In re Proposed New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 488. See also R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 39-1-1, -26-4, -26.1-7 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
12. In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 489.
13. Id. at 490.
14. Id. (citation omitted).
15. Id. at 491-92.
16. Id. Although certain ratepayers, like petitioners, obtain a portion of
their electricity from suppliers other than National Grid, they are still subject
to any rate increases because such increases are assessed through the
distribution fee which National Grid charges to all ratepayers, regardless of
who supplies their electricity. Id.
17. Id. at 492.
18. Id.
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the transmission cable project, while Deepwater Wind was not. 19
The 2009 PPA was submitted to the PUC for approval in
DocketNumber 4111, and on March 30, 2010, the three-member
commission unanimously denied approval of the contract stating
that it was not "commercially reasonable" as required by the 2009
LTC statute. 20 Specifically, the commission found that the 24.4
cents per kilowatt hour pricing along with the annual 3.5%
increase would result in a significant rise in Rhode Island energy
prices, which would cost the state an estimated $390 million over
the twenty year term of the contract. 2 1 The PUC compared the
"'terms and pricing"'22 of the 2009 PPA to those of other renewable
energy projects "'regardless of sizing restrictions, technology,
location, or novelty."' 23 The commission found that the pricing
contained in the 2009 PPA was "'higher than that which an
experienced power market analyst would expect to see in
transactions involving newly developed renewable energy
resources,"' and thus, concluded that the contract was not
"commercially reasonable." 24
B. The Amended LTC Statute and Amended PPA
In response to the PUC's rejection of the 2009 PPA, the
General Assembly amended the Long-Term Contracting statute by
editing only section 39-26.1-7, the section regarding the New
Shoreham project.2 5 This amended statute was signed into law on
June 15, 2010, approximately two months after the PUC rejected
the 2009 PPA.2 6 The General Assembly was perfectly clear in the
first sentence of the amended LTC statute when it stated its
intention to "facilitate the construction of a small-scale offshore
wind demonstration project off the coast of Block Island."27 The

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 492-93.
Id. at 493.
Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-2(1) (Supp. 2010)).
23. Id. (quoting In re Proposed New Shoreham Project Pursuant to R.I.
Gen. Laws § 39-26.1-7, R.I.P.U.C. No. 4111, slip op. at 71 (Apr. 2, 2010)).
24. Id. at 494 (quoting In re Proposed New Shoreham Project Pursuant
to R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1-7, R.I.P.U.C. No. 4111, slip op. at 68 (Apr. 2,
2010)).
25. Id. at 494-95.
26. Id. at 495.
27. R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-26.1-7(a) (Supp. 2010).
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legislature stated that it supported this project in an effort to
[P]osition the state to take advantage of the economic
development benefits of the emerging offshore wind
industry; promote the development of renewable energy
sources that increase the nation's energy independence
from foreign sources of fossil fuels; reduce the adverse
environmental and health impacts of traditional fossil
fuel energy sources; and provide the Town of New
Shoreham with an electrical connection to the
mainland.28
In order to effectuate these goals, the General Assembly
authorized National Grid and Deepwater Wind to "enter into an
amended power purchase agreement ...

on terms that are

consistent with the [2009 PPA]," and allowed for changes to "dates
and deadlines" as well as changes "made to take into account" any
legislative amendments to the 2009 LTC statute, provided that
any changes to the agreement "shall ensure that the pricing can
only be lower, and never exceed, the original pricing included in
the [2009 PPA]." 29
As with the 2009 PPA, the amended PPA was to be submitted
to the PUC for approval, however, this time, the General
Assembly delineated an entirely new standard under which the
commission was to review the contract.30 First, the PUC was to
review the agreement "taking into account the State's policy
intention to facilitate the development of a small offshore wind
project in Rhode Island waters, while at the same time
interconnecting Block Island to the mainland." 31 Next, the
legislature laid out a four-part test declaring that the PUC "shall
approve" the amended PPA if the four criteria are met. 32
The first criterion was that the "terms and conditions" of the
agreement were to be "commercially reasonable."33 However, in
the amended LTC statute, this phrase was newly defined to "mean
terms and pricing that are reasonably consistent with what an
28.
29.

Id.
Id.

30.

In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 495.
§ 39-26.1-7(c).

31.
32.
33.

Id.
§ 39-26.1-7(c)(i).
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experienced power market analyst would expect to see for a
project of a similar size, technology and location, and meeting the
policy goals in subsection (a) of this section." 34 Second, the
amended PPA was to "contain[] provisions that provide[dI for a
decrease in pricing if savings c[ould] be achieved in the actual cost
of the project pursuant to subsection 39-26.1-7(e)." 35 Third, the
agreement must have been "likely to provide economic
development benefits, including: facilitating new and existing
business expansion and the creation of new renewable energy jobs;
the further development of Quonset Business Park; and,
increasing the training and preparedness of the Rhode Island
workforce to support renewable energy projects."36 Finally, the
amended PPA must have been "likely to provide environmental
benefits, including the reduction of carbon emissions."37 "An
advisory opinion on the findings of economic benefit" from the
Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation ("EDC") and "an
advisory opinion on the environmental benefits" from the Rhode
Island Department of Environmental Management ("DEM") were
to be given "substantial deference" by the PUC when making its
findings on the third and fourth criteria. 38
Expanding on the second criterion, the General Assembly also
added three more directives in section 39-26.1-7(e) regarding the
price-savings provisions of the agreement. 39 First, the General
Assembly stated that the amended PPA "shall provide for terms
that shall decrease the pricing if savings can be achieved in the

34. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv). These policy goals are
to facilitate the construction of a small-scale offshore wind
demonstration project off the coast of Block Island, including an
undersea transmission cable that interconnects Block Island to the
mainland in order to: position the state to take advantage of the
economic development benefits of the emerging offshore wind
industry; promote the development of renewable energy sources that
increase the nation's energy independence from foreign sources of
fossil fuels; reduce the adverse environmental and health impacts of
traditional fossil fuel energy sources; and provide the Town of New
Shoreham with an electrical connection to the mainland.
§ 39-26.1-7(a).
35. § 39-26.1-7(c)(ii).
36. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iii).
37. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv).
38. Id.
39. See § 39-26.1-7(e).
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actual cost of the project, with all realized savings allocated to the
benefit of ratepayers." 40 Second, the legislature directed that
The amended [PPA] shall also provide that the initial
fixed price contained in the [2009 PPA] shall be the
maximum initial price, and any realized savings shall
reduce such price. After making any such reduction to
the initial price based on realized savings, the price for
each year of the amended [PPA] shall be fixed by the
terms of said agreement.4 '
Finally, the General Assembly stated that "[tihe amended [PPA]
shall require that the costs of the project shall be certified by the
developer," and verified by "[a]n independent third-party.

.

. at the

completion of the construction of the project."42 Once verified,
these "final costs" were to be used by the PUC to "reduce the
expense to ratepayers consistent with a verified reduction in the
project costs."4 3
As a final mandate in the amended LTC statute, the General
Assembly declared that "[t]he project shall include a transmission
cable between" Block Island and the mainland.4 4 Like the 2009
LTC statute, National Grid was permitted to opt out of the
transmission cable project in the amended LTC statute. 45 Unlike
the 2009 LTC statute, however, the amended LTC statute added
that Deepwater Wind "may elect to" own the transmission cable if
National Grid in fact opted out. 46
Taking into account the amendments to the LTC statute,
National Grid and Deepwater Wind amended their agreement.47
This amended PPA contained the same pricing terms as the 2009
PPA, but explicitly provided an estimated construction cost of
$205 million which was not found in the 2009 PPA.48
Additionally, the amended PPA contained a provision which
allowed both National Grid and Deepwater Wind to opt out of
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

§ 39-26.1-7(e)(i).
§ 39-26.1-7(e)(ii).
§ 39-26.1-7(e)(iii).
Id.
§ 39-26.1-7(f)
Id.
See § 39-26.1-7(i) (emphasis added).
In re Proposed New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 497 (R.I. 2011).
Id. at 497-98.
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participating in the transmission cable project, whereas the 2009
PPA included an opt-out only for National Grid.49 The amended
PPA was then submitted to the PUC for approval on June 30,
2010 in PUC Docket Number 4185.50
C. The PUC Decision
A majority of the PUC including Chairman Elia Germani
("Chairman Germani") and Commissioner Paul J. Roberti
("Commissioner Roberti") approved the amended PPA, while
Commissioner Mary E. Bray ("Commissioner Bray") filed a
dissenting opinion.51 Chairman Germani and Commissioner
Roberti also filed concurring opinions on a single issue, finding
that the amended PPA was likely to provide economic benefits,
but coming to that conclusion for different reasons. 52
Emphasizing the General Assembly's policy goals, the
majority stated that they "interpreted any ambiguities in the law

and weighed the evidence in a manner to effectuate 'the
development of a small offshore wind project in Rhode Island
waters."' 53 Through this lens, the majority concluded that the

amended PPA met each of the criteria set out by the legislature in
the amended LTC statute.54 Commissioner Bray filed a dissenting

opinion, stating that she did not interpret the law or weigh the
evidence differently than she would in any other matter." She
concluded that the amended PPA was not commercially
reasonable, was not likely to provide economic development
benefits, and that the price-savings provision did not comply with

the amended LTC statute. 56 Thus, she declared that the amended
PPA should not be approved. 7

49.
50.

Id. at 498.
Id. at 497.

51.
52.

Id. at 498.
Id.

53. In re Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett
Elec. and Deepwater Wind Block Island, LLC Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §
39-26.7, R.I.P.U.C. No. 4185, slip op. at 130 (Aug. 16. 2010) (quoting R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 39-26.1-7(c) (Supp. 2010)).
54.

In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 498-99.

55.
56.
57.

Id. at 501.
Id. at 501-02.
Id. at 502.
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D. Petitions for Writ of Certiorari
Pursuant to section 39-1-5, Toray Plastics (America), Inc.
("Toray"), Polytop Corporation ("Polytop"), former Attorney
General Patrick Lynch, and the Conservation Law Foundation
("CLF") all filed petitions for a writ of certiorari with the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, which were granted and consolidated.58
The Court also permitted then-Governor Carcieri, Rhode Island
Senate President, M. Teresa Paiva-Weed, and Rhode Island
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Gordon D. Fox to
intervene on behalf of National Grid and Deepwater Wind
(collectively "respondents").59 The newly-elected Attorney General
Peter Kilmartin then withdrew his petition for writ of certiorari.6 0
With the Attorney General no longer party to the case, Toray,
Polytop and CLF were required to demonstrate that they had
standing to argue before the Court in this matter. 61 After a showcause hearing on the sole issue of standing, the Court held that
Toray and Polytop met the standing requirements, but CLF did
not.62 Thus, Toray and Polytop (collectively "petitioners") were
the only parties left to argue the case. 63 Therefore, only the issues
raised by these two parties were before the Court.
II. IN RE REVIEW OF PROPOSED TOWN OFNEW SHOREHAM PROJECT
Petitioners offered many arguments in support of their
position, which can be grouped into two large categories: (1) those
that focused on the four criteria set out in section 39-26.1-7(c), and
(2) those derived from elsewhere in the amended LTC statute.6
Each of these arguments will be examined in turn.
A. Standard of Review
The Court's standard of review in this case was not the usual

58.

Id. at 503.

59.
60.

Id.
Id.

61. Id.
62. Id. A majority of the Court also decided that it would not overlook
the issue of standing based on the "substantial public interest" presented by
the issues in the case. Id.

63.

Id.

64.

Id. at 506-07.
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standard applied in appeals from administrative agencies. 65
Rather, the General Assembly has articulated a separate standard
for appeals from the PUC.66 Section 39-5-3 declares that "[tihe
findings of the commission on questions of fact shall be held to be
prima facie true... and the supreme court, shall not exercise its
independent judgment nor weigh conflicting evidence." 67 On the
other hand, the Court reviewed questions of law decided by the
commission, including statutory interpretation, de novo, but gave
the commission deference in its interpretation of statutory
Finally, the General
language where ambiguity existed.68
Assembly has articulated that "[a]n order or judgment of the
commission made in the exercise of administrative discretion shall
not be reversed unless the commission exceeded its authority or
acted illegally, arbitrarily, or unreasonably." 69 As the Court aptly
stated, "[w]ithout question. . . 'petitioner[s] ha[d] a difficult burden
to bear."' 70
B. The PUC's Deference to the Amended PPA
The first claim raised by petitioners was that the PUC
majority did not act as an "impartial, independent body," as
required by section 39-1-11, but rather gave the amended PPA
excessive deference in favor of approval. 7 1 This contention stems
from the PUC majority's statement that in reviewing the amended
PPA, it "purported to resolve 'any ambiguities in the law and
weighed the evidence in a manner to effectuate"' "'the
development of a small offshore wind project in Rhode Island
waters."' 72
The Court held that the PUC majority did not exceed its
authority by taking into account the policy intentions that the
General Assembly articulated in section 39-26.1-7(c).7 3 Rather,
65. Id. at 504.
66. Id.
67. R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-5-3 (2006).
68 In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 504-05.
69. § 39-5-3.
70. See In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 506 (quoting In
re Kent Cnty. Water Auth. Change Rate Schedules, 996 A.2d 123, 128 (R.I.
2010)).
71. Id. at 507. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-1-11 (2006)).
72. Id. (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 508.
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the majority was simply reviewing the case as it was directed to
by the legislature. 74 Furthermore, the Court did not believe the
commission was acting as a "rubber stamp" given the extensive
written opinion and description of evidence that the majority
provided.
C. Insufficient Time-frame for the PUC to Conduct Its Review
Petitioners next argued that the forty-five day window that
was statutorily prescribed for the PUC to review the amended
76
PPA was insufficient "to fully study and evaluate the issues."
However, this issue was not properly before the Court because
petitioners did not raise it in their petitions for writ of certiorari.77
Nonetheless, the Court stated that even if the issue was properly
raised, the Court would not substitute its judgment for that of the
Legislature, which statutorily mandated a forty-five day period of
review.78
D. Respondents' Lack of Commitment to Participate in the
Transmission Cable Project
Petitioners' next line of arguments stemmed from
respondents' lack of commitment to participate in the
transmission cable project. First, petitioners contended that
various portions of the amended LTC statute required the
amended PPA to address all aspects of the transmission cable
project and that the lack of commitment to such a project violated
the amended LTC statute.79 However, the Court held that
petitioners had merely "cherrypick[ed]" from the "overarching
policy goals" laid out in the amended LTC statue, and "cobbl[ed]
together" these provisions in order to fabricate a statutory
mandate.8 0 The Court stated that the amended LTC statute
clearly separates the wind farm and the transmission cable into
two distinct projects.8 1 While the entire "project shall include a
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 508.
Id.

78.

Id.

79.

Id. at 509.

80.
81.

Id. at 509.
Id.
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transmission cable," the Court held that nothing in the amended
LTC statute mandates that this particular agreement provide for
such a cable. 82
Also, within this line of arguments regarding the
transmission cable, petitioners contend that the absence of
binding transmission-cable provisions in the amended PPA
violates section 39-26.1-7(a), which authorizes an amended PPA
"enter[ed] into... on terms that are consistent with the [2009
PPA]."8 Petitioners argue that since the 2009 PPA allowed only
National Grid to opt out of participating in the transmission cable
project while the amended PPA allowed both National Grid and
Deepwater Wind to opt out, the two agreements contained
inconsistent terms, thus violating the amended LTC statute. 84
The Court first declared that this argument was deemed waived
because it was not addressed in the petition for writ of certiorari.
The Court also held that even if the argument had not been
waived, petitioners would not have prevailed because the terms of
both PPAs were consistent. 86 It reasoned that the amended PPA
allowed for both parties to opt out of the transmission cable
project and the 2009 PPA allowed "permissive, but not mandatory,
termination of the" agreement if a transmission cable was not
constructed. Thus, both contracts allowed for construction of the
wind farm without a commitment from either party to construct
the transmission cable, and were, therefore, "consistent."8 8
E. Failure to Stabilize Long-Term Energy Prices
Petitioners' next contented that the amended PPA failed to
"'stabiliz[e] long term energy prices' because it called for a 3.5%
yearly price increase and, therefore, should have been rejected by
the PUC. 89 The Court held that the stabilization of long-term
82.

R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-26.1-7(f) (Supp. 2010); In re Proposed New

Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 509-10.
83. § 39-26.1-7(a); In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 513.
84. In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 512.
85.
86.
87.
88.
514.

Id.
Id. at 514.
Id.
See § 39-26.1-7(a); In re Proposed New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at

89.

In re Proposed New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 514 (quoting R.I.

GEN. LAws § 39-26.1-1 (Supp. 2010)).
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energy prices was merely an "overarching policy aim" of the
general "Long-Term Contracting Standard for Renewable Energy"
and was not even a policy goal mentioned in section 39-26.1-7,
which was specific to the Town of New Shoreham Project. 90
Furthermore, when read with the other policy aims in section 3926.1-1, it is clear that the legislature intended the stabilization of
energy prices to come from a decreased consumption of fossil fuels
because of their volatile prices. 9 1 Thus, the Court held that a
steady 3.5% per year increase in price was stable because the
increase lacked fluctuation. 92 Therefore, according to the Court,
the amended PPA will "stabilize" energy prices within the
meaning of section 39-26.1-1.93
F. Contention that the Amended PPA is not Commercially
Reasonable
The first issue raised by petitioners that was derived from the
four criteria in section 39-26.1-7(c) was whether the terms and
conditions contained in the amended PPA were commercially
reasonable. 94
The definition of the term "commercially
reasonable" was changed in the amended LTC statute to "mean
terms and pricing that are reasonably consistent with what an
experienced power market analyst would expect to see for a
project of a similar size, technology and location, and meeting the
policy goals in subsection (a) of this section."95
90.
91.

Id. at 514-515.
Id. at 515. See also § 39-26.1-1.

92.

In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 515.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv) (Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
These policy goals are
to facilitate the construction of a small-scale offshore wind
demonstration project off the coast of Block Island, including an
undersea transmission cable that interconnects Block Island to the
mainland in order to: position the state to take advantage of the
economic development benefits of the emerging offshore wind
industry; promote the development of renewable energy sources that
increase the nation's energy independence from foreign sources of
fossil fuels; reduce the adverse environmental and health impacts of
traditional fossil fuel energy sources; and provide the Town of New
Shoreham with an electrical connection to the mainland.
§ 39-26.1-7(a).
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Under this new definition, petitioners first argued that the
PUC should be reversed because it did not consider the costs of
the transmission cable in its analysis, and that adding those costs
would render the amended PPA commercially unreasonable. 96
However, the Court held that since the amended LTC statute did
not require that the amended PPA contain terms for the
construction of a transmission cable, the PUC was not required to
consider the cost of the transmission cable project in its analysis of
whether the amended PPA was commercially reasonable. 97
Next, petitioners argued that the amended PPA was not
commercially reasonable because of the above-market costs that
ratepayers will be charged once the wind farm becomes
operational.9 8
However, the Court held that petitioners
misapplied the statutory definition of "commercially reasonable,"
which compares the amended PPA only to "project[s] of a similar
size, technology and location," and not to the price of electricity
produced from fossil-fuels. 9 9
Finally, petitioners contend that the PUC focused its analysis
of the agreement's commercial reasonableness on the costs of the
project, and not on the price of electricity that will be produced
therefrom (24.4 cents per kilowatt hour). 0 0 However, the Court
cited to the PUCs reliance on evidence from Deepwater Wind's
expert witness David P. Nickerson ("Mr. Nickerson"), and others,
who specifically testified that the pricing of the project was
"commercially reasonable when compared to other projects [and]
'adjusted for size, location, and technology.""'o The Court stated
that it would not question the factual findings of the commission,
and since the commission accepted Mr. Nickerson's testimony as
credible evidence, the Court was not in a position to disagree with
that decision.102 Accordingly, the Court upheld the PUC's finding

96.

In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project,25 A.3d at 516.

97. Id. at 516-17; The Court noted that it agreed with petitioners that
the amended LTC statute requires the construction of a transmission cable;
however, nothing in the statute required that the amended PPA contain
terms for the construction of the cable. Id.
98.
99.

See id. at 517.
§ 39-26.1-7(c)(iv); In re Proposed New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at

517.
100.

In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 516-17.

101.
102.

Id. at 517 (citation omitted).
Id.
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that the amended PPA was commercially reasonable.10 3
G. Contention that the Amended PPA did not Contain Proper
Price-Savings Provisions
Moving on to the second criterion in section 39-26.1-7(c),
petitioners argued that the amended PPA did not "contain[]
provisions that provide for a decrease in pricing if savings c[ould]
be achieved in the actual cost of the project pursuant to subsection
39-26.1-7(e)," and should have, therefore, been rejected by the
On this front, petitioners first claimed that the amended
PUC.'1
PPA did not utilize the proper "'base amount'" of construction and
further, petitioners challenged the "cost verification process"
contained in the agreement.10 5
Regarding the "base amount" argument, petitioners asserted
that the 2009 PPA contained an estimated cost of construction of
$219 million dollars, and the amended PPA contained an estimate
of $205 million, yet the pricing of 24.4 cents per kilowatt hour did
not change.106 Thus, they argued, when the "final costs" are
verified, there will be a decrease in costs without an accompanying
decrease in price, in violation of section 39-26.1-7(c)(ii).10 7 The
Court addressed this contention in two ways. First, it stated that
the amended LTC statue requires that the 'initial fixed price"'
contained in the 2009 PPA be the "'maximum initial price' that
can be charged. 0 8 Thus, the 24.4 cents per kilowatt hour price
cannot be raised, which it was not in the amended PPA; however,
nothing in the amended LTC statute requires that the estimated
cost of construction must be the same in the amended PPA as it
was in the 2009 PPA.109 Second, the Court stated that, despite
evidence that the 2009 PPA's pricing was based on an estimated
cost of $219 million, there was also credible evidence that such
pricing was actually based on an estimated cost of $205 million."l0

103.
104.
518.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
§ 39-26.1-7(c)(ii); In re Proposed New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at
In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 518.
Id. at 517-18.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 520 (quoting § 39-26.1-7(e)(ii)).
Id.
Id.
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Since the PUC majority ultimately chose to credit the $205 million
estimate over the $219 million estimate, it was perfectly
acceptable for the amended PPA to also use the $205 million
estimate as its base cost."' As such, if there is a decrease in
actual "final costs" below the $205 million base, the Court noted,
there still would be a trigger to decrease the price in the amended
PPA.112 Therefore, according to the Court, it was not improper for
the amended PPA to utilize the base cost amount of $205 million
and a price of 24.4 cents per kilowatt hour. 113
Petitioners' second challenge to the price-savings provision
was that the amended PPA does not comply with section 39-26.17(e)(iii) which requires that "[t]he reasonable costs of' the third
party verification of the actual costs of the project be paid by "the
developer." 1 4
Petitioners read this statute as adding a
"'reasonableness' criterion" such that the independent third-party
may verify the costs only if they are reasonable." 5 The Court first
stated that the issue was not mentioned in a petition for writ of
certiorari, and was therefore waived.' 16 However, even had the
issue been properly raised, the Court refused to read the statute
as adding a 'reasonableness' criterion" in the verification
process.1 17 The statute requires only that the developer pay for
reasonable costs "for conducting the verification." 18
H. Contention that the Amended PPA is not Likely to Provide
Economic Development Benefits
Next petitioners argued that the amended PPA fails to meet
the third criterion in section 39-26.1-7(c).1 19 The amended statute
required that the amended PPA must be "likely to provide
economic development benefits, including: facilitating new and
existing business expansion and the creation of new renewable
energy jobs; the further development of Quonset Business Park;
111. Id.
112. Id. at 518.
113. In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 520-21.
114. R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-26.1-7(e)(iii) (Supp. 2010); In re Proposed New
Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 521.
115. In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 521.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (emphasis in original).
119. Id. at 521-22.
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and, increasing the training and preparedness of the Rhode Island
workforce to support renewable energy projects." 2 0 Additionally,
the Legislature required an expert from the EDC to provide "an
advisory opinion on the findings of economic benefit," of which the
PUC was to give "substantial deference" when making its own
findings regarding this criterion. 12 1
Petitioners offered several arguments as to why the EDC
advisory opinion was not based on credible evidence and was not
entitled to substantial deference.122 However, the Court stated
that the EDC put forth credible evidence before the PUC, which
the majority found to be more credible than contrary evidence
offered by petitioners.123 The Court again declared that it would
not disturb the commission's fact-finding, nor second guess its
credibility determinations.1 24
Petitioners also argued that respondents failed to put forth
any evidence of likely economic development benefits before the
PUC, and thus, the commission should have rejected the amended
PPA.12 5 The Court rejected this argument and held that the
Legislature's direction that the PUC give "'substantial deference'"
to the EDC advisory opinion indicated that respondents were not
required to proffer any of their own evidence concerning the likely
economic benefits of the project. 126 Rather, evidence from the
advisory opinion was all that was necessary to approve the
amended PPA because the General Assembly clearly felt that the
EDC was "best equipped" to analyze economic benefits.127
Finally, petitioners claimed that since a majority of the
commissioners utilized the "net-benefits test" in analyzing
economic benefits, this test became the "law of the case."1 28
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-26.1-7(c)(iii) (Supp. 2010).
§ 39-26.1-7(c)(iv).
In re ProposedNew Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 522.
Id. at 522-23.
Id. at 523.
Id.
Id.

127.

Id.

128. Id. Chairman Germani did not believe a "net-benefits" test was
required under the amended LTC statute and instead looked simply at
economic benefits without examining any offsetting economic detriments. Id.
at 523 n.45, 524. However, Commissioners Bray and Roberti both believed
the net-benefits test was required, but only Chairman Roberti felt that the
amended PPA passed this test. Id. Thus, two of the three members of the
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Furthermore, they argued, the amended PPA failed to pass this
test because it would cause a net loss to the Rhode Island economy
when both costs and benefits are computed.129 The Court first
held that the "law of the case" doctrine is discretionary and
applies only to courts of the same judicial level, not to reviewing
courts on appeal.130 Next, the Court stated that there were three
distinct interpretations of the economic benefits criterion by the
three PUC commissioners and, thus, the Court could grant no
deference to any one interpretation.131 The Court then went on to
give its own interpretation of this criterion and declared that it
did not require a net-benefits test, and thus, the PUC was
required only to look at possible economic benefits and not
potential costs of the project.132
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first noted that the
General Assembly offered specific examples of the types of
economic benefits that were to be examined under the statue, and
did not list a single potential cost that should be included in the
analysis.1 33 Furthermore, the General Assembly explicitly called

for a net-benefits test in section 39-26.1-8 regarding a future
utility-scale wind farm in Rhode Island waters. 134 Thus, the
Court concluded that the legislature would have explicitly called
for a net-benefits test in the amended LTC statute, if it intended
for such a test to apply to the small-scale wind farm at issue in
this case.135 Therefore, the Court held that the amended LTC
statute did not require a net-benefits test, and when examining
only economic benefits, the amended PPA satisfied the third
criterion of section 39-26.1-7(c).1 36
PUC applied the net-benefits test, but, the actual majority (Chairman
Germani and Commissioner Roberti) approved the amended PPA while
applying two different tests. Id.
129. Id. at 524.
130. Id. at 523.
131. Id. at 524.
132. Id. at 525.

133.

Id.

134. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-26.1-8(b)(i) (Supp. 2010)).
135. Id. at 525-26. The Court noted the "parade of irrational possibilities
that could incur" from analyzing only the benefits of the project without
examining any costs. Id. at 526. However, the Court felt that this analysis
was the "clear intention" of the Legislature and refused to add "unwritten
words into the statute[]." Id.
136. Id. at 526.
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I. Contention that the Amended PPA is not Likely to Provide
Environmental Benefits
The final contention by petitioners was that the amended
PPA is not likely to provide environmental benefits as required by
the amended LTC statute because there is no commitment to
construct a transmission cable, and without the cable, no
environmental benefits will be realized. 137 However, the Court
stated that there was ample evidence of environmental benefits in
DEM's advisory opinion, which was given "'substantial deference"'
by the PUC as required by the statute.13 8 Furthermore, the Court
emphasized the word "likely" in the amended LTC statute and
held that even without a commitment to construct a transmission
cable, approval of the amended PPA brings the state one step
closer to a fully operational wind farm, thus creating the
"likelihood" that environmental benefits will be realized.139
J. Conclusion
The Court concluded by noting its "trepidation" over the wind
farm project, but cited the narrow standard of review which
constrained its decision in this case. 14 0 Finally, the Court offered
its "fervent hope" that the wind farm project will be as successful
as the Legislature believes it will be.14 1
III. COMMENTARY
This was arguably the most important case decided by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court during the 2010-2011 term. Its
outcome will affect the Rhode Island economy, the environment,
and every Rhode Island citizen both now and far into the future.
The first noticeable consequence of this decision and the
construction of the wind farm is that Rhode Island electricity
prices will likely rise, at least for the twenty-year term of the
amended PPA. Even using National Grid's estimate, this increase
in electricity rates will cost Rhode Island ratepayers $390 million

137.
138.

Id.
Id.

139.
140.
141.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 527.
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dollars over the life of the contract.142 Additionally, the increased
energy rates will likely drive some businesses out of the state
while deterring new businesses from entering, both of which will
decrease tax revenues and available jobs.
However, despite the costs to the Rhode Island economy, the
project also has its benefits. While only six permanent jobs will be
created, many workers will be needed on a temporary basis during
the organization and construction phases of the project.143
Furthermore, it is important to note that this particular wind
farm is merely a "small-scale... demonstration project" and is
designed to be the first step in establishing Rhode Island as a hub
of renewable energy production. 1 In the future, the Legislature's
goal is to construct a "utility-scale" wind farm off the coast of
Rhode Island which will be significantly larger and produce much
more energy.145 Based on economies of scale, the electricity
produced by this larger wind farm should be sold at a far more
reasonable rate than that which will be produced by the smallscale wind farm.146 Another goal of this demonstration project is
to make Rhode Island the first state with an offshore wind farm
and to establish it as the center of the industry.147 This, in turn,
may help develop Quonset Business Park as a heart of training for
workers in the renewable energy field.148 While these appear to
be lofty goals, in order for any of them to be realized, the
demonstration project must first be completed.
Additionally, the project will provide environmental benefits
including a reduction in pollution and carbon emissions, not to
mention a decreased reliance on foreign sources of fossil fuels.
While these benefits will be minute in the whole energy scheme,
again, they are only the first step toward a clean-energy future
and energy independence.
It is far too early to tell if this "William Seward-esque"149
142. Id. at 493.
143. See id. at 524.
144. R.I. GEN LAWS § 39-26.1-7(a) (Supp. 2010).
145. See id. § 39-26.1-8.
146. See In re Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between
Narragansett Elec. and Deepwater Wind Block Island, LLC Pursuant to R.I.
Gen. Laws § 39.26.7, R.I.P.U.C. No. 4185, slip op. at 42 (Aug. 16. 2010).
147. See id.
148. See § 39-26.1-7(c)(iii).
149. In re Proposed New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 527. The Court
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project will bring about all of the benefits that it is intended to
provide, and while the Court has very justified reservations, 150 the
future is still unknown. Certainly, there will be upfront costs that
Rhode Island will have to bear in order gain entry into the
offshore wind industry. There are, however, many potential longterm benefits that an offshore wind farm will bring to Rhode
Island.
Surely all of these considerations were weighed in the minds
of the Justices when deciding this case. However, from a legal
standpoint, the Court's review of this matter was severely
constrained by the legislature.151 In several ways, the PUC was
given little choice but to approve the amended PPA and the Court
was given even less latitude in its review of the PUC's decision. 152
It is quite obvious that the General Assembly amended the
2009 LTC statute specifically in order to gain approval of a PPA
and advance the wind farm project. 153 This intention is stated
expressly in the first line of the amended LTC statute and can be
inferred from the amendments to several sections of the statute,
which were based on the PUC's expressed reasons for rejecting the
2009 PPA.154 One example of these amendments is the definition
of "commercially reasonable" that the Legislature changed so that
only projects of "similar size, technology and location" could be
compared to the proposed Block Island wind farm when the PUC
reviewed the amended PPA.'5 5 This new definition was clearly a
described the legislature's decision to advance the offshore wind project as
"William Seward-esque" referring to former Secretary of State William
Seward's decision to purchase Alaska in 1867. Id. Like the General
Assembly, Seward had many skeptics; however, he was vindicated when
large amounts of gold were discovered in Alaska. Id. at 527 n.47.
150. See id. at 526-27.
151. See R.I. GEN. LAwS § 39-5-3 (2006) (stating that a decision from the
PUC "shall not be reversed unless the commission exceeded its authority or
acted illegally, arbitrarily, or unreasonably").
152. See id.
153. § 39-26.1-7(a) ("The general assembly finds it is in the public interest
for the state to facilitate the construction of a small-scale offshore wind
demonstration project off the coast of Block Island .. .
154.

Id.

155. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv). While there are clearly instances where a project
could be commercially reasonable under this definition, but would not be
commercially reasonable using the ordinary meaning of the phrase, the
courts must apply the law using the definitions articulated by the
Legislature. Thus, in a statute, if the Legislature explicitly defines "black" to
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response to the PUC's finding that the 2009 PPA was not
commercially reasonable because its pricing was far higher than
all "newly developed renewable energy resources," regardless of
size, technology and location.15 6 Additionally, in rejecting the
2009 PPA, the PUC indicated that the definition of "commercially
reasonable" in the 2009 LTC statute did not include an analysis of
economic benefits.157 Instead only pricing could be examined. 5
Based on this conclusion, the General Assembly amended the
standard such that economic benefits were explicitly included in
the definition of "commercially reasonable." 59
These amendments and this case as a whole highlight an
interesting aspect of the law regarding a judicial or quasi-judicial
body's standard of review and the separation of powers doctrine.
The PUC is a legislatively-created entity that possesses only those
powers that the Legislature has delegated to it.160 Therefore, it
must perform its function within the confines that the General
Assembly has established for it. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court, on the other hand, is the highest authority in an entirely
separate branch of government with constitutionally-derived
jurisdiction over "all questions of law and equity."' 6 ' Thus, it
would be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers
doctrine for the Legislature to dictate the standard by which the
Court must review such questions.1 62 However, the specific issue
of whether the PUC correctly approved the amended PPA is not a
mean "white," the courts should not apply the word's ordinary connotation,
nor should they define it to mean any shade of gray.
156. See In re Proposed New Shoreham Project Pursuant to R.I. Gen.
Laws § 39-26.1-7, R.I.P.U.C. No. 4111, slip op. at 68 (Apr. 2, 2010).
157. See id. at 68-69.
158. See id. at 69.
159. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iii).
160. See generally R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-1-3 (2006) ("To implement the
legislative policy set forth in § 39-1-1 and to serve as the agencies of the state
in effectuating the legislative purpose, there are hereby established a public
utilities commission and a division of public utilities and carriers.").
161. R.I. Const. art. X, § 2.
162. See Chicago Joe's Tea Room LLC v. Vill. of Broadview, No. 07 C
2680, 2009 WL 3824723, at *2 (N.D.Ill., Nov. 12, 2009) (citing Millineum
Maint. Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Lake, 894 N.E.2d 845, 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)
("[T]he legislature had the legal authority (under Illinois' separation of
powers doctrine) to dictate the appropriate standard of review to the courts
only because the decision [being reviewed] is an administrative-not
legislative-decision.").
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question of law or equity, but rather an instance in which the
Legislature has conferred additional jurisdiction upon the Court
pursuant to article X, section 2 of the Rhode Island
Constitution.163 Therefore, the Legislature was free to establish
the standard by which the Court reviewed the PUC's approval of
the amended PPA.1 6' In this instance, the General Assembly has
essentially delegated power to the Supreme Court, just as it has
delegated power to administrative bodies such as the PUC. 165
It should be pointed out that certain matters raised in this
case constituted "questions of law," and thus, the Court itself
established the standards by which those issues were reviewed.166
These matters included any instance where the Court interpreted
the provisions of a statute, such as section 39-26.1-7. Thus, in
stating the standard of review, the Court articulated that it would
apply one standard for "questions of law" and a different standard
in its review of the PUC's "[u]ltimate [d]ecision-[mlaking.16 7
In applying the law to the facts and specifically in reviewing
the PUC's approval of the amended PPA, the Court was forced to
apply the deferential standard prescribed by the legislature
whereby the PUC could be reversed only if it "exceeded its
authority or acted illegally, arbitrarily, or unreasonably." 6 8
Given this standard and the General Assembly's unequivocal
desire that a wind farm be built, the Court's decision affirming the
PUC's approval of the amended PPA was the proper legal result.
Additionally, even if the Court had reversed the decision of

163. See R.I. Const. art. X, §2; § 39-5-1; § 39-5-3.
164. Clearly if the Legislature could establish the Court's standard of
review in all matters, it could set a standard by which the Court defers fully
to the Legislature, thus, usurping all of the Court's power. This would
effectively eliminate an entire branch of government and would, thus, be an
obvious violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
165. The delegation of power from the legislative to the judicial branch
raises separate concerns regarding the separation of powers doctrine;
however, this delegation is likely constitutional in Rhode Island because
article X, section 2 allows additional jurisdiction to be conferred upon the
Court when "prescribed by law." R.I. Const. art. X, § 2.
166. See In re Proposed New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 504-06 (R.I.
2011).
167. Id. at 504-06. The Court also articulated a separate standard by
which it reviewed questions of fact, which was also created judicially. Id. at
504.
168. R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-5-3 (2006).
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the PUC, the Legislature almost inevitably would have amended
the LTC statute again to allow for the project to move forward. In
that case, a reversal of the PUC's decision would have only
postponed the inevitable. However, in the meantime, other states
could have constructed wind farms, thus ruining any possibility of
establishing Rhode Island as a hub of renewable wind energy.
Finally, despite the Court's "trepidation" over the proposed
wind farm project, it adhered to its proper role in government by
"put[ting] aside" its own 'appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of
a particular course consciously selected by the [Legislature],"' and
correctly elected not to interfere with the public policy decisions of
the General Assembly.169
CONCLUSION

The Legislature's unequivocal intention to have a wind farm
built in Rhode Island waters, along with the prescribed standard
of review in this case, dictated that the Court affirm the PUC's
decision approving the amended PPA. Yet, aside from the legal
aspects of this case, the Court's decision will have many
significant implications for the future of Rhode Island and all of
its citizens. To state it succinctly, this case is as important as it is
complicated and will have as many ramifications as it has
acronyms. And while there are many reason to remain leery of
the wind farm project, there are just as many reasons to remain
hopeful that the project will bring many long-term benefits to the
state.

169. See In re Proposed New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 503, 527
(citation omitted).

